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THE CONSCIOUS CURRICULUM: FROM NOVICE TOWARDS 
MASTERY IN WRITTEN LEGAL ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY 
Sarah O. Schrup & Susan E. Provenzano* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, law schools have been barraged by education-reform 
proposals with ideas for producing practice-ready lawyers. Just as 
forcefully, the bench and bar have beseeched law schools to produce better 
legal writers. They lament that law graduates still write as beginners, 
without a hint of the expert technique or sophistication that should be on 
display after three years of law school.
1
 
The reformers are right. Currently the law school curriculum works 
well for specialization and subject-matter mastery, but not for lawyering or 
legal-writing mastery. Accepted in word, but not in deed, the calls for 
reform along lawyering lines in the ABA’s 1992 MacCrate Report,2 the 
2007 Carnegie Report,
3
 and the 2007 Clinical Legal Education 
Association’s Best Practices Report4 have been perceived by many faculties 
as too ambitious, too expensive, or unnecessary.
5
 And so change has been 
sluggish, at least when held up against the reports’ urgent tone and strong 
merits. 
This Essay proposes a mastery-based curriculum. In contrast to the 
three reports’ broader emphasis on practice readiness, the mastery at play 
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1
  See Erika Abner & Shelley Kierstead, A Preliminary Exploration of the Elements of Expert 
Performance in Legal Writing, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 363, 364 n.5 (2010) (collecting articles and 
surveys that prove this point). 
2
  A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE 
REPORT]. 
3
  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF 
LAW 9 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT] (“The task of professional education is to facilitate 
novices’ growth into . . . competence, moving toward expertise.”). 
4
  ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 3–4 (2007) [hereinafter BEST 
PRACTICES], available at http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best_practices-cover.pdf. 
5
  See, e.g., Gary Shaw, A Heretical View of Teaching: A Contrarian Looks at Teaching, the 
Carnegie Report, and Best Practices, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1239 (2012); Brian Leiter, “Training Law 
Students for Real-Life Careers” . . . or Deja Vu All Over Again, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS 
(Nov. 2, 2007, 10:54 AM), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2007/11/training-law-st.html. 
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here centers on a core competency of lawyering: an amalgam of logical 
analysis, creative and ethical problem solving, and these ideas’ effective 
communication.
6
 By focusing on written legal analysis and advocacy—
skills universally agreed to be vital
7
 but too often lacking in law 
graduates—this Essay provides a launching point for curricular planning. It 
proposes a three-year integrated cognitive and social apprenticeship that 
coordinates its three curricular strands—doctrinal, clinical, and legal 
writing—to broaden the cognitive dimension and to reclaim the social 
dimension. And as discussed below, this apprenticeship can be 
implemented rather easily and inexpensively, so long as faculty agree to 
collaborate across curricular lines and to make deliberate choices about 
ordering students’ education. 
Part I of this Essay examines how legal education is misaligned with 
the multidisciplinary research on expertise. This Essay then discusses the 
broad outlines of a mastery curriculum that properly weights the cognitive 
and social dimensions of expertise and better balances law schools’ three 
curricular strands. Using the legal research and writing (LRW) curricular 
strand as a case study, Part II continues with a blueprint for implementing 
the integrated apprenticeship for written legal analysis and advocacy in a 
realistic way. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF MASTERY IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
During the last 140 years, law schools have not reliably produced 
practice-ready lawyers or proficient legal writers. This Part explores why 
outdated curricular design impedes law schools from promoting mastery in 
written legal analysis and advocacy. In short, law schools elevate a narrow 
cognitive apprenticeship over social-discourse acquisition, when an 
integrated cognitive–social apprenticeship is what promotes mastery. 
A. The Reality of Legal Education 
Legal education has lost sight of its roots in apprenticeship and law 
practice’s social character. The legal profession is a highly conventionalized 
discourse community
8
 that can be entered only after intense socialization in 
 
6
  This Essay’s proposals are geared towards litigation-based writing, rather than transactional 
lawyering, because law school curricula remain heavily focused on lawyers as litigators. See, e.g., 
A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL 
CURRICULA: 2002–2010 (Catherine L. Carpenter ed., 2012) [hereinafter ABA SURVEY]. However, the 
principles could be applied to wide swaths of skills courses and substantive law classes. It boils down to 
making efficient and deliberate choices about core courses. See infra Part II.E. 
7
  Abner & Kierstead, supra note 1, at 363–64; see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 106–11. 
8
  J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 
60 (1994). A discourse community is a “dynamic, collective entity of practitioners bound by an intricate, 
socially constructed web of beliefs and common disciplinary practices.” Huiling Ding, The Use of 
Cognitive and Social Apprenticeship to Teach a Disciplinary Genre, 25 WRITTEN COMM. 3, 5 (2008). 
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the ways of its expert members.
9
 Discourse community socialization is best 
gained through a sustained apprenticeship
10
 between aspiring and 
experienced members. Experienced members model expert techniques in 
authentic social roles—roles that real lawyers play—and the newcomers 
imitate these techniques until they too master them.
11
 Law schools used to 
meld apprenticeship and discourse socialization. Indeed, the foundation for 
early American legal training was the English apprenticeship model.
12
 
Under that model, aspiring lawyers were brought into law’s discourse 
community as clerks and spent years learning from the practitioners.
13
 But 
when Christopher Langdell took the helm at Harvard Law in 1869, legal 
education via law practice was replaced with law science and the case 
method.
14
 The case method elevated formal knowledge gleaned from the 
objective study of appellate cases over socialization through real-life 
lawyering and working with clients.
15
 Most schools embraced the case 
method, sounding the death knell for apprenticeships.
16
 
Still wedded to Langdell’s conceptions,17 today’s legal education is 
neither structured as an intensive apprenticeship nor grounded in discourse 
socialization. Instead, legal education is one-sided,
18
 relying heavily on a 
narrow cognitive apprenticeship that teaches legal analysis from a top-down 
perspective.
19
 The case method is linear, primarily oral, and a-contextual; it 
 
9
  See Joseph M. Williams, On the Maturing of Legal Writers: Two Models of Growth and 
Development, 1 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 1, 13, 16 (1991) (characterizing law as a discourse community 
where learners acquire expertise from fully “socialized” members who, in real-life settings, “show 
concretely . . . how we want them to behave so that they will behave like us”). 
10
  James Paul Gee, Literacy, Discourse, and Linguistics: Introduction and What Is Literacy?, in 
LITERACY: A CRITICAL SOURCEBOOK 525, 527 (Ellen Cushman et al. eds., 2001). 
11
  See Ding, supra note 8, at 5. 
12
  David S. Clark, Tracing the Roots of American Legal Education—A Nineteenth-Century German 
Connection, 51 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 313, 
317 (1987). 
13
  See Ralph Michael Stein, The Path of Legal Education from Edward I to Langdell: A History of 
Insular Reaction, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 429, 440, 444–45 (1981). 
14
  Id. at 448. Langdell believed that “[w]hat qualifies a person, therefore, to teach law is . . . not 
experience, in short, in using law, but experience in learning law . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
15
  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4–6. 
16
  See Mary Beth Beazley, Better Writing, Better Thinking: Using Legal Writing Pedagogy in the 
“Casebook” Classroom (Without Grading Papers), 10 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 23, 23 (2004). 
17
  See Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 609, 610 (2007) (arguing that “the basic educational approach that law schools use remains 
essentially unchanged from the one” Langdell introduced). 
18
  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 186 (“Compared to other professional fields, which often 
employ multiple forms of teaching through a more prolonged socialization process, legal pedagogy is 
remarkably uniform across variations in schools and student bodies.”). 
19
  See id. at 60–78. Analyzing a contracts class dialogue, the Carnegie Report observes four core 
components of a cognitive apprenticeship: (1) modeling, where the professor demonstrates the cognitive 
process of legal analysis; (2) coaching, or giving students guidance and feedback on their analysis; (3) 
scaffolding, or supporting students who are struggling through the analysis; and (4) fading, or stepping 
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is not iterative, writing-intensive, or tied to a practice setting.
20
 It moves 
through oral analysis of cases in doctrinal chunks rather than improving 
thinking and writing through a law-practice-bound cycle of rehearsal, 
analysis, criticism, and revision.
21
 According to cognitive researchers, this 
iterative, socially situated cycle is vital to improving novices’ thinking and 
writing in a professional discipline and is “at the center of core legal 
practices.”22 But the 1L year is dominated by case-method courses, with just 
LRW offering the only iterative and socially situated course.
23
 The second 
and third years of law school continue the steady diet of doctrinally 
centered case-method courses.
24
 Although upper-level doctrinal courses 
progress in specialization, these courses typically continue to use the case 
method to promote subject mastery, not lawyering mastery. The clinical and 
skills training courses that foster discourse socialization and offer an 
intensive apprenticeship with writing experiences
25
 remain “mere[] 
adjuncts”26 to the dominant casebook learning approach. They are taught as 
separate electives that a minority of students take.
27
 So the dominant 
narrative of legal education remains what it was over a century ago: a 
 
back and letting students perform analysis on their own. Id. at 61. This apprenticeship is narrow not just 
because it is cognitive and not social, but also because the cognitive work centers on analytical thinking 
that distills facts and law into “controlled components” abstracted from the complexity of legal problems 
in practice settings. Id. at 81. 
20
  The Langdellian model has been criticized since its inception as impractical and not 
representative of law practice. See, e.g., Kara Abramson, “Art for a Better Life:” A New Image of 
American Legal Education, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 227, 234–35. 
21
  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 98. 
22
  Id. 
23
  Id. at 104–05. In most law schools, required practical (as opposed to academic) legal writing 
courses are limited to the first year, and in overall curriculum they remain “marginal and peripheral” as 
compared to their case-method brethren. See, e.g., David S. Romantz, The Truth About Cats and Dogs: 
Legal Writing Courses and the Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 133–35 (2003). 
24
  ABA SURVEY, supra note 6, at 33–34 (noting that 50% of respondents required students to take 
Evidence, 25% required Business Organization, 21% required Criminal Procedure; only 3% required 
clinical courses); Tonya Kowalski, Toward a Pedagogy for Teaching Legal Writing in Law School 
Clinics, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 285, 295–96, 310 (2010) (in a clinician survey about collaboration, the 
“great majority reported a one-year ‘standard’ curriculum, with some variations as to upper-level 
electives,” and only two schools with respondents in this survey had three or more required semesters of 
legal writing). 
25
  Bryan L. Adamson et al., The Status of Clinical Faculty in the Legal Academy: Report of the Task 
Force on the Status of Clinicians and the Legal Academy, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 353, 364–67 (2012) 
(describing how clinics offer social apprenticeships deeply embedded in authentic practice situations). 
26
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 191. Although most law schools have in-house legal clinics, 
very few devote the resources that would enable the clinic to serve all of the students in a law school. 
See Elliott S. Milstein, Clinical Legal Education in the United States: In-House Clinics, Externships, 
and Simulations, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 375, 380–81 (2001). 
27
  In a 2010 National Association for Law Placement (NALP) survey of young associates, only 30% 
of them had participated in a clinic while in law school and a majority of those for only one semester. 
NALP FOUND., 2010 SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES AND 
BENEFITS 6, 10 (2011), available at http://www.nalp.org/uploads/2010ExperientialLearningStudy.pdf. 
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narrow cognitive apprenticeship in which most of the curriculum remains 
divorced from law’s social practices. 
B. Learning Theories Conflict with the Reality of Law School Curriculum 
Other disciplines tell a very different story about how learners develop 
mastery. The cognitive psychologists, linguists, and composition theorists 
who study the phenomenon of mastery agree that there are not one but two 
interrelated dimensions to expertise: the cognitive and the social.
28
 The 
social dimension of mastery is critical, for no matter what the discipline, 
expertise “does not exist in a vacuum.”29 Likewise, mature learning happens 
through partnership with others, and it is socially cast by the learning 
situation and the culture.
30
 In the cognitive dimension, mastery is not simply 
reusing the cognitive apprenticeship’s four basic tools—modeling, 
scaffolding, coaching, and fading
31—again and again in different contexts. 
Rather, mastery in the cognitive dimension requires using these four tools 
progressively to increase the challenge over time. 
Turning to the discourse community of law,
32
 a long-term active 
“master-apprentice relationship in a social practice” is an absolute 
prerequisite to achieving expertise.
33
 The linguist James Paul Gee calls this 
concept “acquisition,” and he contrasts it with “learning.” Acquisition 
means “acquiring something subconsciously by exposure to models and a 
process of trial and error.”34 In contrast, learning is “conscious knowledge 
gained through teaching . . . . [that] involves explanation and analysis.”35 
Acquisition occurs organically, in socially authentic settings, and from the 
bottom up; learning is taught, top-down, and its primary role is to impart 
knowledge that allows students to explain, analyze, and critique what they 
have learned.
36
 Although learning aids intellectual understanding, only 
acquisition is critical to expertise.
37
 Gee summed up the difference: “[W]e 
are better at what we acquire, but we consciously know more about what we 
 
28
  See, e.g., Michael Carter, The Idea of Expertise: An Exploration of Cognitive and Social 
Dimensions of Writing, 41 C. COMPOSITION & COMM. 265, 274–85 (1990); Williams, supra note 9, at 9. 
29
  Williams, supra note 9, at 13. 
30
  This is a precept of Lev Vygotsky, the influential social constructivist whose ideas contributed 
heavily to social apprenticeships, see SHARAN B. MERRIAM ET AL., LEARNING IN ADULTHOOD 292 (3d 
ed. 2007), and cognitive apprenticeships, see Ding, supra note 8, at 5. 
31
  For an explanation of each tool, see supra note 19. 
32
  See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 8, at 58, 60. Law is a “dominant secondary discourse” as 
opposed to a primary discourse, like one’s native language. Gee, supra note 10, at 530–33. A dominant 
secondary discourse is learned later in life, and its mastery gives the user access to “social ‘goods,’” 
such as money, prestige, and status. Id. at 528. 
33
  Gee, supra note 10, at 530. 
34
  Id. at 539. 
35
  Id. 
36
  Id.; see also id. at 532, 540. 
37
  Id. at 542. 
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have learned.”38 In other words, expert performance in a discourse cannot 
be taught solely—or even mostly—through overt instruction or learning.39 
The acquirers, who have apprenticed with masters in the discourse and been 
exposed to models in natural, meaningful, and functional settings, will 
outperform learners nearly every time.
40
 Classroom learners may still 
engage in what Gee calls “mushfake” discourse, which requires cobbling 
together bits of experience and bits of classroom learning in order to “make 
do.”41 But mushfakers never attain expertise and never enter the discourse 
community. And given today’s legal practice demands, graduating 
mushfaking lawyers and legal writers is not an option. 
As for cognitive development, according to the major developmental 
theories that influence curricular planning,
42
 mature learners’ intellectual 
development progresses in distinct and upward-moving stages. The novice 
stages are marked by yearning for concrete knowledge, looking for the one 
“right” answer to a question or problem, and deference to authority.43 In the 
middle stages, the learner questions and reflects on what she has learned, 
begins to manage higher levels of abstraction, accepts multiple “right” 
views and answers, and becomes comfortable with ambiguity.
44
 
Approaching expertise, the learner becomes an autonomous, fluid 
performer.
45
 She accepts the legitimacy of conflicting positions but can 
commit to one; she has freed herself from concrete “rules” and operates 
using higher order principles; she applies knowledge creatively, able to 
choose from multiple approaches to solve problems without clear goals or 
paths to resolution.
46
 But these phases are not self-executing; they must be 
facilitated through conscious curricular design. 
C. Reconciling Learning Theory with Legal Education’s Reality: 
Emphasize Acquisition and Deliberately Structure the Cognitive 
Apprenticeship as a Progression 
In law schools today the cognitive and social aspects are imbalanced; 
the social apprenticeship is shunted to the side and the cognitive 
apprenticeship is underdeveloped. But law schools can improve the balance 
 
38
  Id. at 540. 
39
  Id. at 539. 
40
  Id. at 532, 540. 
41
  Mushfake is prison lingo for “making do with something less when the real thing is not 
available.” Id. at 533. 
42
  I.e., Perry’s cognitive constructivism and Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. MERRIAM ET 
AL., supra note 30, at 326–35; Williams, supra note 9, at 4–7. 
43
  See Williams, supra note 9, at 3–6. 
44
  See id. 
45
  See Carter, supra note 28, at 272. 
46
  Williams, supra note 9, at 4–6; see also MERRIAM ET AL., supra note 30, at 332–35; Abner & 
Kierstead, supra note 1, at 366. 
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to promote mastery in two ways. First, they can recalibrate the curriculum 
to stop marginalizing the social dimension of expertise. Second, they can 
transform the one-dimensional cognitive apprenticeship into a robust, 
phased three-year apprenticeship that better accounts for how novices 
develop expertise in the cognitive dimension. 
First, to promote socialization, law schools should decrease the 
proportion of top-down learning courses and increase the proportion of 
acquisition courses with practical writing components. No matter how 
artfully structured, the case-method approach is no substitute for the 
acquisition courses so vital to the development of lawyering expertise. Even 




Consistent with a social discourse model, then, doctrinal courses 
should not dominate the curriculum. At a minimum, such courses should 
taper off—or be integrated with acquisition courses.48 Assuming a more 
prominent place in the curriculum, the acquisition courses should, over 
time,
 49
 incrementally usher students into law’s discourse community. These 
courses should replicate expert-generating “communities of practice,” 
which pair novices and experts in authentic settings to solve real-life (or 
life-like) problems.
50
 Students can then invest sustained effort, earn more 
responsibility, take on “more difficult and risky tasks,” and gain identities 
as “master practitioner[s].”51 
Second, in addition to shunting socialization to the margins with too 
much doctrinal learning, law school’s cognitive dimension only scratches 
the surface of how novices become experts. The multidisciplinary research 
on expertise shows that novices should be brought along in consciously 
designed phases.
52
 But law schools currently offer uncoordinated 
instruction in different subject matters that use the four cognitive 
apprenticeship tools at essentially the same level of difficulty. To promote 
mastery, these tools should not be used unsystematically within separate 
courses, but progressively over time, across many courses. Within this 
coordinated cognitive apprenticeship, professors and students should also 
assume complementary learning and teaching roles, with the professor 
 
47
  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 56–57, 76–77, 188. 
48
  See infra Part II; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 (Because law is a “social practice that 
includes particular habits of mind,” legal education “loses a key dimension” unless it offers “an 
understanding of legal practice from the inside.”). 
49
  See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 8, at 77 (“Socializing students into legal discourse requires 
considerable time, usually more than one year.”). 
50
  Abner & Kierstead, supra note 1, at 373–74 (Communities of practice are a “‘set of relations 
among persons, activity, and the world . . . .’ Members observe and participate; newcomers are gradually 
drawn over time into the community as they undertake authentic activities.” (quoting JEAN LAVE & 
ETIENNE WENGER, SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL PARTICIPATION 98 (1991))). 
51
  Id. at 374. 
52
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 116–18. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W C O L L O Q U Y 
 87 
pulling back gradually until students become capable of reflective 
judgment, and of managing indeterminacy and complex problem solving.
53
 
Balancing and reconciling the cognitive and social dimensions of 
expertise yields the outlines of a mastery-based curriculum. Over three 
years, law school should offer an integrated cognitive and social 
apprenticeship in written legal analysis and advocacy by decreasing 
learning courses, increasing acquisition courses, and calibrating the 
cognitive apprenticeship’s tools to create a phased challenge. The next task 
is to coordinate and capitalize on all three of law school’s curricular strands 
to achieve these goals. 
1. The Integrated Apprenticeship: An Attainable Curricular 
Collaboration Among Strands. 
a. Doctrinal strand.—In a more measured proportion than now, 
law schools should continue to offer doctrinal courses, for they provide a 
powerful (though narrow) cognitive apprenticeship in the ability to analyze, 
explain, and criticize the law; isolate and apply facts; and abstract general 
principles that can be applied to later situations.
54
 Scholarly seminars also 
can advance the cognitive apprenticeship when they involve an in-depth 
dialogue that challenges black-letter principles,
55
 accompanied by an 
iterative writing and feedback process. But these upper-year courses should 
have components that place students squarely in authentic practice 
scenarios and require them to confront and write about three-dimensional 
messy and dynamic client problems. For example, a one-credit brief-writing 
option could be appended to a handful of core, upper-level doctrinal 
courses—Criminal Procedure, Evidence, Jurisdiction, and Administrative 
Law, to name a few. For a stipend and teaching credit (or CLE credit for 
practitioners), clinicians, LRW professors, and alumni could develop a bank 
of topic-specific brief problems and comment on 2Ls’ discrete brief-writing 
assignments.
56
 Not only must the cognitive apprenticeship be supplemented 
with aspects of authentic practice, but it must also be consciously designed 
 
53
  See Steven D. Schwinn, Developmental Learning Theory and the American Law School 
Curriculum, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 33, 37–39 (2009) (using William Perry’s developmental stages and 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development to argue that law teaching should move students into 
the “final stage” of independent reflection and commitment). 
54
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 75, 81. 
55
  See Philip C. Kissam, Seminar Papers, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 339, 339–42 (1990). 
56
  Currently, LRW and doctrinal professors collaborate on assignments in only 25% of law schools, 
and only an average of 24% of upper-level doctrinal courses have a practical writing component. See 
ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL 
WRITING SURVEY, at v, 30 (2012) [hereinafter ALWD SURVEY], available at http://www.alwd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/2010-survey-results.pdf. But 58% of LRW faculty members teach upper-level 
writing courses and 86% teach courses beyond LRW as part of their regular teaching load. See id. at xi. 
The brief-bank work could be credited towards that upper-level load or could be compensated as a cost-
effective overload, and a professor could reserve excess teaching credits for teaching relief in later years. 
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to operate at increasingly higher levels over the three years. As discussed 
below, whereas modeling and scaffolding are more appropriate in 1L case-
method courses, upper-level courses should employ coaching and fading. 
For example, under this model a first-year Civil Procedure professor would 
not only introduce the concept of jurisdiction and its foundational cases, but 
would also provide models of briefs that analyze real jurisdictional disputes. 
Doing so is a form of scaffolding that ratchets up the level of legal analysis. 
Then, in a Civil Procedure II or Federal Courts course offered in the second 
or third year, the professor would introduce more advanced and thorny 
jurisdictional problems, but then step back—fading, as it is called—and 
give students free rein to analyze and solve them. 
b. LRW strand.—First-year LRW courses already provide 
situational instruction for the first stages of the social apprenticeship. They 
are designed to offer extensive expert feedback and early opportunities for 
reflection, two cognitive apprenticeship features absent from their 1L 
doctrinal counterparts.
57
 But these courses vary in quality across schools, 
and some try to cram into a single year the entire writing and advocacy 
apprenticeship along with other lawyering skills.
58
 Advanced legal writing 
courses also may be acquisition courses that generate expertise, but only if 
they eschew rote repetition of beginner paradigms and embrace meaningful 
simulations that mirror the legal and factual complexity in authentic 
practice settings. Therefore, LRW professors should coordinate first-year 
and upper-level legal writing coursework (and offer more of it) to foster 
expertise in both cognitive and social dimensions.
59
 
c. Clinical strand.—Clinical courses are essential to mastery 
because they best replicate the social apprenticeship, fully steeped in the 
acquisition model. Scholars have described clinical pedagogy as a “Prepare-
Perform-Reflect” methodology.60 Students actively prepare their 
representation of a live client and then perform that service under a faculty 
member’s supervision. Afterwards, the student and supervising clinical 
faculty member reflect on the experience. “[I]n every sense, the nature of 
clinical teaching connects the cognitive, practical, and ethical aspects of 
lawyering, and provides students opportunities to apply their knowledge . . . 
and to develop their professional identities.”61 But because live-client 
clinics cannot be controlled and planned out as other courses can, they are 
not as easy to mold to the cognitive apprenticeship. Again, partnership 
 
57
  See Beazley, supra note 16, at 40–41 (In legal writing courses, “students work from the bottom 
up instead of from the top down” with teachers “guiding them along the way through in-class 
workshops, written critiques, and individual conferences.”). 
58
  See Wayne Schiess, Legal Writing Is Not What It Should Be, 37 S.U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2009). 
59
  Part II details how the integrated apprenticeship can work in the LRW strand. 
60
  Adamson et al., supra note 25, at 364–67. 
61
  Id. at 366. 
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among strands is critical. For example, LRW and doctrinal faculty could 
guest lecture at strategic times in a clinic semester. Using the legal issues in 
a current clinic case, they could model writing about and scaffold facility 
with the law’s substance. Because modeling and scaffolding are the most 
difficult cognitive apprenticeship tools to employ in dynamic live-client 
situations, the LRW and doctrinal faculty’s input here would be invaluable. 
Conversely, clinicians can visit doctrinal classrooms to demonstrate how 
the course’s theory and doctrine propel their clinic practice—a potent form 
of modeling. 
Coordinated and recalibrated, each strand makes vital contributions to 
the integrated apprenticeship’s greater emphasis on acquisition courses and 
a more robust cognitive dimension. But this ideal will never work if it runs 
up against the institutional and economic obstacles that have hampered the 




2. Overcoming Institutional and Economic Obstacles to Reform.— 
The authors see three main obstacles to the changes proposed in the 
MacCrate, Carnegie, and Best Practices reports. First, it may be that these 
reports’ excellence also undermines their implementation. The panoply of 
options creates too many paths for curricular innovation, and the result is an 
incremental, scattershot hodgepodge
63
 of new courses without a deliberate 




Second, institutional homogeneity and resource scarcity hamper 
change. The vast majority of new hires at law schools are traditional 
 
62
  Despite strong statements of support from law deans and a flurry of strategic plans stemming 
from the calls of the MacCrate, Carnegie, and Best Practices reports, real and effective curricular 
changes are slow in coming. For example, though all three reports recommend a significant increase in 
clinical education for law students, CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 194–97; BEST PRACTICES, supra 
note 4, at 188; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 237–38, in the most recent ABA Survey on Law 
School Curricula, just three years ago, only 3% of schools required students to take clinical courses, 
ABA SURVEY, supra note 6, at 33. These reports also recommend collaboration among the three 
curricular strands, CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 194–97; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 71; 
see also MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 332, but this goal too remains elusive, see, e.g., Kowalski, 
supra note 24, at 294 (reporting survey results showing that 93% of responding clinical programs have 
“no planned or uniform approach to supervising legal writing”). 
63
  See, e.g., AALS COMM. ON CURRICULUM, SURVEY OF INNOVATIONS IN LAW SCHOOL 
CURRICULA 16–18 (2006), available at http://www.aals.org/documents/curriculum/Survey.pdf 
(describing over thirty different specialties law schools offer); see also id. at 31–33 (providing over 
thirty discrete examples of post-1L curriculum changes schools have made in recent years); id. at 36–39 
(describing several dozen different ways in which such changes came about or are in development). 
64
  Peter Toll Hoffman, Teaching Theory Versus Practice: Are We Training Lawyers or Plumbers?, 
2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 625, 637 n.66 (describing law schools’ efforts at curricular change as mere 
“window dressing”). 
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doctrinal professors, rather than those who teach clinical or LRW courses.
65
 
And innovation can be seen as too expensive, especially if it involves more 
experiential learning, which some view as more costly than large doctrinal 
courses. As discussed in this Essay, however, experiential learning in 
written legal analysis and advocacy can be made cost-effective through 
creative partnerships, a willingness to step away from the status quo, and a 
sensible allocation of resources. 
Third, these reports have not accounted for the haphazard evolution of 
legal education, which might explain half-hearted, disorganized, or 
unsuccessful innovation efforts. Having replaced the apprenticeship model 
two centuries ago, Langdell’s case-method model of doctrinal teaching has 
been around since 1869. Legal writing as a discipline steeped in New 
Rhetoric
66
 did not develop until much later in the twentieth century. Clinics, 
too, are a twentieth-century development, emanating from the 1930s’ legal 
realist movement,
67
 and maturing along with social justice concerns in the 
1960s.
68
 It is no wonder that curricular innovation efforts are infected by a 
similar haphazard approach—and by jockeying for position when 
collaboration should happen instead. 
This Essay’s phased three-year integrated apprenticeship addresses 
these obstacles. It promotes mastery by adjusting and pulling the three 
strands together in a more balanced manner. Its proposed deliberate 
progression is founded on faculty coordination and partnership and 
incremental change, not a new faculty composition or sweeping directives. 
The integrated apprenticeship will require planning, open-mindedness, and 
some resource reallocation. But it will not demand curricular overhaul, 
massive expenditures, or, at the other one-dimensional extreme, turning law 
schools into pure authentic practice laboratories. 
The next Part uses a LRW curricular case study as a more concrete 
example of how law schools can accomplish this three-year integrated 




  See id. at 638 & n.69; David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-
to-be-lawyers.html (“[H]alf of a law school’s budget is spent on faculty salary and benefits, and . . . 
tenure-track faculty members consume about 80 percent of the faculty budget . . . .”). 
66
  See generally Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of 
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1999). 
67
  Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1932 (2002). 
68
  Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1465 
(1998). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W C O L L O Q U Y 
 91 
II. A LRW CASE STUDY IN THE INTEGRATED COGNITIVE AND  
SOCIAL APPRENTICESHIP 
Legal education’s mastery project can take its first step with the LRW 
strand, and this Part sets up the framework. Because LRW courses already 
target this key element of lawyering and are a first-year staple, it makes 
sense to study the integrated cognitive and social apprenticeship through the 
LRW lens. LRW is also a good case-study subject because its signature 
pedagogy
69
 lends itself to the integrated apprenticeship. Done well, LRW 
pedagogy simulates authentic writing tasks calibrated in difficulty, guided 
by experts through an iterative process of definition, demonstration, 
performance, feedback, reflection, and revision.
70
 The apprenticeship has 
four phases: two in the first year, and one each in the second and third 
years. 
Currently, most law schools follow a standard model for first-year 
LRW.
71
 In semester one, the professor tackles objective legal writing, often 
in the legal memorandum format. The first semester leans heavily on the 
ingrained
72
 IRAC (Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion) organizational–
analytical paradigm or one of its variants.
73
 In the same semester, the 
professor introduces the class to legal authorities, the basics of legal 
research, and citation. The second semester shifts the genre and rhetorical 
context to persuasive writing and oral argument with more complex 
problems. The students act as advocates, writing briefs to courts. 
As explained in more detail in the suggestions and proposals section 
below, the existing first-year LRW course should remain intact, with two 
caveats. First, the course should tailor and streamline instruction to the core 
competency, rather than injecting other lawyering and drafting skills. 
Second, first-year LRW should do a more effective job pacing and pushing 
analytical and writing sophistication. As for instruction beyond the first 
 
69
  Carol McCrehan Parker, The Signature Pedagogy of Legal Writing, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 
463, 466 (2010); see CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 107–09 (describing the expert-generating 
benefits of legal writing pedagogy). 
70
  Parker, supra note 69, at 466; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 109. 
71
  Beneath the surface, though, first-year programmatic quality varies widely, dependent on LRW 
resources, faculty status, teaching quality, and institutional commitment. Even though this Essay makes 
generalizations about LRW teaching and curricula, the authors realize that this is an oversimplification, 
a footing from which to argue an ideal model. 
72
  See Tracy Turner, Finding Consensus in Legal Writing Discourse Regarding Organizational 
Structure: A Review and Analysis of the Use of IRAC and Its Progenies, 9 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: 
JALWD 351, 352–53 (2012) (“Many legal writing scholars believe that novice legal writers need a 
paradigm structure like IRAC to get them started on mastering the skill of effective organization and 
analysis. . . . Currently, most textbooks teach a set structure, whether or not they label it with an 
acronym.” (footnote omitted)). 
73
  See Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking About Legal 
Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 898 (2002). Many of the professors interviewed use alternative 
formulations of IRAC, usually either to add an additional element of explanation to the rule statement or 
to adapt the format to persuasive writing. 
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year, the integrated apprenticeship should continue in Phases 3 and 4 with a 
coordinated, consciously designed upper-division curriculum that extends 
beyond LRW courses. These phases should be implemented through an 
acquisition-heavy slate of upper-level courses that draw on all three 
curricular strands, because no single type of course can provide the 
integrated apprenticeship students need. With coordination among LRW 
faculty, clinical faculty—and ideally, doctrinal faculty and practitioners—
law schools will not need to add a host of new courses or hire new faculty. 
Instead, faculty can alter teaching methods and partner in strategic ways to 
implement the integrated apprenticeship, moving students towards mastery 
in written legal analysis and advocacy. 
A. Phase 1—First Year, First Semester: Knowledge, Modeling, 
Approximating, and Basic Socialization 
The goals in Phase 1’s integrated apprenticeship, linked to the first 
semester, should be modest and well-defined. Law school is jarring for new 
students, who are oblivious to the legal discourse community that they are 
about to enter.
74
 On top of that, the cognitive overload is staggering.
75
 As a 
result, even the most proficient prelaw writers regress before they get 
better.
76
 Students must be eased into the integrated apprenticeship, with an 
eye towards situating these novices in the discourse community.
77
 
The students’ objective in Phase 1, then, is basic socialization into the 
genre known as legal writing. The professor aims to establish context, 
impart basic knowledge and “rules” about the discourse, and model a host 
of simplified tasks. Thus, this earliest phase includes more learning time 
and less acquisition time because novice law students must first build a 
robust, discourse-specific knowledge base on which they can later draw.
78
 
Fundamentally, students must know how to analyze legal authorities and 
use that knowledge to solve a client’s problems. The intensive instruction 
that LRW professors already provide on these subjects remains critical: 
cases versus statutes, understanding and analyzing them both, and learning 
when to turn to secondary sources for guidance. Phase 1 should also 
continue to teach the mainstay modes of legal reasoning, such as synthesis 
and analogical reasoning, to name a few. Discussing audience and rhetorical 
context is crucial to socialization, so professors must address them. Finally, 





To that end, IRAC and 
its variants can play a role. But instead of leaving the organizational 
instruction at IRAC, which is the norm right now, the professor should 
 
74
  Williams, supra note 9, at 14. 
75
  Id. at 15. 
76
  Id. 
77
  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 117. 
78
  See Carter, supra note 28, at 274–75. 
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frankly acknowledge that the IRAC “rules” will eventually be replaced with 
more flexible and sophisticated approaches to organization
79
 as students 
advance in the discourse.
80
 
On the social-apprenticeship front, LRW professors should continue to 
design realistic client problems. The students’ writing tasks should be at the 
novice level: simple analytical documents with determinate law and facts.
81
 
Students’ roles in the assignments should also be tailored to the novice 
stage; playing the junior writer on a routine analytical matter is appropriate. 
Integrating the cognitive apprenticeship, the professor’s most potent 
Phase 1 device is modeling—demonstrating how to perform a task through 
a detailed analysis of representative work.
82
 Here, LRW professors have a 
deep well to draw from—and many already do. They can show prewriting 
strategies: how an expert analyzes authorities, sifts facts, and thinks about 
how the authorities might work together to produce an answer. The 
professor can also explain and model the overall writing process, though in 
a simplified, Phase-1 way. Turning to the end game of audience-centered 
writing, professors can display fairly simple, and thus relatable, models of 
effective and ineffective analytical writing.
 
This modeling of prewriting and 
writing tasks is powerful: it shows novices what works, what does not, and 
how to emulate expert writing strategies.
83
 
Just as important in Phase 1 is the cognitive apprenticeship tool of 
scaffolding. Here, professors push novices up the mastery continuum using 
writing models that prompt students to assess them against the foundational 
rules they have learned.
84
 This exercise yields strategies that students carry 
with them as they begin to write on their own.
85
 Professor support during 
the writing process should be strong and explicit to counteract students’ 
cognitive overload and lack of socialization. Concrete criteria, detailed 
comments on multiple drafts, and frequent conferences throughout allow 
professors to assess students’ work against the “rules” for improved 
performance.
86
 The professor’s feedback should also point out typical 
novice shortfalls and suggest strategies for improvement.
87
 These forms of 
scaffolding promote nascent mastery because they make expert practices 
 
79
  See Turner, supra note 72, at 354 n.10 (cataloging IRAC critiques in the LRW literature). 
80
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 116. 
81
  See Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, From Snail Mail to E-Mail: The Traditional Legal 
Memorandum in the Twenty-First Century, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32, 49 (2008) (discussing the benefits of 
introducing “[s]hort form memoranda” and “substantive e-mail[s]” rather than teaching 1Ls exclusively 
through the medium of traditional, lengthier memos). 
82
  Ding, supra note 8, at 5. 
83
  Id. at 26. 
84
  See id. at 25. 
85
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 109. 
86
  See Ding, supra note 8, at 28. 
87
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 109–10. 
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Intense scaffolding prepares students for the next phase, which adds social 
and rhetorical context, complexity, uncertainty, and critical reflection. 
B. Phase 2—First Year, Second Semester: Variety, Reflection, Better 
Approximation, and More Socialization 
Phase 2 should start in the second semester,
89
 and its goals are to 
introduce a variety of authentic writing projects, critical reflection, and 
more community-of-practice elements. Explicit modeling and scaffolding 
remain important teaching tools, but they should encompass more complex, 
higher stakes writing tasks with compelling social purposes.
90
 Phase-2 
writing tasks may introduce new audiences and genres (courts and clients, 
briefs and letters) and new purposes and rhetorical contexts (writing to 
persuade, writing to inform clients). These tasks should inject new 
categories of legal questions (questions of pure law, rather than law–fact 
application) and new modes of analysis (interpreting indeterminate 
statutory language). Writing from these many angles gives students a 
chance to adapt the relatively context-free “rules” they applied in first-
semester analytical writing tasks to more context-bound tasks. 
To advance socialization, professors can assign students more 
demanding, simultaneous, and authentic roles.
91
 Students should serve not 
only as advocates within their own assignments, but also as analysts, 
editors, and revisers of their colleagues’ work.92 Students should engage in 
realistic writing collaboration
93
 and start peer teaching. At this stage, 
though, peer review should be highly structured, and tied to specific expert-
approximating goals.
94
 Whatever the form, these community-of-practice 
elements should be tailored to these advanced beginners and be as authentic 
as the context allows. 
On the cognitive side, critical reflection and shifting away from the 
rote disciplinary rules of Phase 1 move the students up the novice–expert 
continuum during Phase 2. As an example, the professor may model and 
critique alternative arrangements for a legal issue with a more complex 
internal structure. She may show how and why expert brief writers 
sometimes “break the rules” of basic organization—omitting introductory 
roadmaps, for instance. Or she may openly criticize the use of stock 
 
88
  Ding, supra note 8, at 29. 
89
  Students’ abilities to move through the phases will doubtless vary across institutions. Schools can 
account for these differences by timing each phase to match student-body needs. 
90
  See Anne Beaufort, Learning the Trade: A Social Apprenticeship Model for Gaining Writing 
Expertise, 17 WRITTEN COMM. 185, 207–13 (2000). 
91
  See id. 
92
  See id. 
93
  See, e.g., Schwinn, supra note 53, at 45–46. 
94
  Ding, supra note 8, at 26–27. 
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paradigms like IRAC when the writing task or legal question is not suited to 
it.
95
 She will also show how different kinds of cases demand different kinds 
of reasoning and structure. These, in turn, become the new, less rigid 
“rules” that students apply to become more nimble and independent in the 
discourse.
96
 By its end, Phase 2 should reveal enough “insider knowledge” 
and expert technique to move novices into an “advanced beginners” 
category, where they can better approximate expert writing. 
C. Phase 3: Competence, Coaching, Fading, and Shedding 
Unlike the raw learning and formalism in Phases 1 and 2, Phase 3 
requires less teaching. Now the push towards expertise should be 
experiential, where, in authentic practice settings, students encounter real 
legal problems rich in variety and complexity. At this stage, the cognitive 
and social apprenticeships are deeply entwined in every task. Here, with 
light-handed expert guidance, students can start to recognize recurring 
patterns in different dimensions of legal problems and develop strategies to 
manage them. Once they become adept at pattern recognition, the students, 
working cooperatively with guiding experts,
97
 can develop their own 
“rules” and their own voice.98 Specifically, students can develop and 
internalize reliable strategies to think about, organize, and write—in their 
own language—about ill-formed legal problems. Take, for instance, a brief 
with a complex statutory interpretation issue: the student must draw on her 
earlier experience to advocate for a certain and concrete solution to an 
indeterminate question. 
Starting in law school’s second year, Phase 3 deploys the cognitive 
apprenticeship tools of coaching and “fading,” where the expert teacher 
gradually removes close support and explicit guidance as the student 
becomes more proficient.
99
 In the coaching role, experts work with students 
as “partners, not authorities”100 to handle legal problems in socially 
authentic settings. The shift to a more dominant coaching role means that 
the expert no longer didactically imparts knowledge; instead, while 
performing authentic legal writing tasks, she makes explicit her insider 
knowledge and the expert writing strategies she uses to handle the ill-





  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 117. 
96
  Id. (Competent writers, in contrast to novices, can “judge that when a situation shows a certain 
pattern of elements, it is time to draw a particular conclusion . . . [and] act in a certain way to achieve the 
selected goal.”). 
97
  See Ding, supra note 8, at 44 (discussing how professors “gradually removed instruction and 
assistance” as students gained competence in NIH grant-writing tasks). 
98
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 117. 
99
  Ding, supra note 8, at 44–45; see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 61. 
100
  Schwinn, supra note 53, at 46. 
101
  Abner & Kierstead, supra note 1, at 366. 
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Students can be coached to legal writing competence in at least two 
ways: (1) assuming more complex writing tasks in a live case; or (2) taking 
a lead role in a simulated case while studying experts’ creative solutions in 
order to spark their own imagination. In live cases, the student can witness a 
full-blown expert writing process, with its recursive fits and starts and 
distinct cognitive stages. Brainstorming meetings where students observe 
and participate in the idea-generating stage of a writing project will implant 
expert prewriting habits into the developing writer’s mind. By collaborating 
on multiple drafts of a writing project, students can observe what rewriting 
really means in the practice world.
102
 In a simulation course, this work 
could dovetail with reflection questions and classroom discussion about 
writing models that display organizational and analytical flaws. 
In upper-level clinic and simulation courses, legal issues defy the neat 
packaging that professors create for students in their first-year writing 
problems. No longer able to simply plug in a law/fact-application model, a 
student must begin abstracting from the early rules to create new flexible 
ones in order to tackle these novel legal problems.
103
 For example, IRAC 
simply will not work with a narrative-based argument that has little law, 
and it is an equally poor fit for law-based arguments of any kind. Here, the 
expert can coach the student through strategies for tailoring her organization 
to a complex legal issue. She can help students discover that all legal 
arguments require three things: premises, proof, and progression. In Phase 
3, the student has enough context-bound knowledge to isolate premises and 
envision an audience-friendly, persuasive arrangement of them. With expert 
coaching, the Phase-3 student should also be able to construct the proof for 
each premise. Expert brief study and reflection remains important, as 
students begin to recognize an argument’s metastructure when they pinpoint 
and critique the expert’s underlying choices. 
If the phases have progressed well, whether in the live-client or 
simulation context, two important steps towards mastery now occur, one by 
the student and the other by the professor. Just as the student begins to shed 
attachments to his beginner ways, the professor will start to fade by 
withdrawing heavy coaching. As the expert fades, the student assumes more 
diverse and challenging writing roles that the expert no longer occupies.
104
 
Thus, at the same time the student experiences the loss of heavy coaching 
with the cognitive apprenticeship phenomenon of fading, he gains from his 
social apprenticeship a higher status writing role. The student should begin 
to feel as though he “owns” his writing again. Through coaching, fading, 
 
102
  Id. at 370, 391 (describing revision as a way to “clarify . . . and generate legal arguments,” and 
to “examine content, structure, and voice”). 
103
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 116–18. 
104
  See Beaufort, supra note 90, at 190–203 (studying how acquisition of writing expertise in a 
nonprofit institution’s community required, over time, progressively sophisticated writing roles, genres, 
and responsibility and exposure to insider knowledge). 
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shedding, and ramping up writing roles, Phase 3’s integrated cognitive and 
social apprenticeship brings students competence and confidence. 
D. Phase 4: Expertise, Self-Direction, and Fluid Performance 
Third-year law students will not become true legal writing experts. But 
they may become subexperts if the integrated apprenticeship has progressed 
well. Because of broad exposure to indeterminate legal problems in Phase 
3, the Phase-4 student starts to see underlying structural analogies between 
prior legal problems and the problem at hand.
105
 By virtue of Phase-3 
experiences and writing responsibilities, patterns emerge more quickly. The 
student may even reach the stage called “expert intuition or judgment”;106 it 
is the end goal of the integrated apprenticeship. 
The expert teacher’s role is much different in Phase 4. Though less 
front and center, it is hardly passive, especially in the live-client context 
where the lawyer’s ethical obligations demand no less. He could variously 
be described as a safety net, a sounding board, a shadow, a cheerleader, and 
a facilitator. He will urge students to formulate their own strategies and 
refer them to their peers for support, but he will guide them when they 
falter. He will introduce and then shape the situations that push students 
towards fluid writing performance.
107
 One of his most important roles is in 
assigning the “imperfect case”—the case that seems a certain loser and hits 
dead ends at every turn. Even practicing lawyers balk in the face of these 
obstacles. But the expert knows that with tenacity and perseverance there is 
usually a way, and it is this task that the expert sets for the subexpert 
student in Phase 4. An equally important role, then, is guiding the student to 
strike the balance between her ethical obligations to the court and client and 
ensuring that she finds her own best solution. By this stage, the student 
should be able to draw on—and abstract from—her much wider knowledge 
base to generate multiple paths towards a favorable resolution. She will, by 
this time, realize that the fruits of this exercise could extend far beyond a 
favorable judicial opinion: upholding first principles, shaping the law, 
fighting for the client, or forcing a settlement. 
Because subexperts must be self-directed, they must also learn to spot 
missing or flawed elements in their own work. These are among the most 
difficult writing tasks of all because the writer must stand directly in her 
audience’s shoes and predict the reader’s skepticism. The writer must then 
imagine the many ways she might satisfy the reader and choose the best 
among them. Phase 4 is the time to develop this skill, for the student should 
 
105
  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 116. These traits capture the expert’s ability to “see 
analogies, to recognize new situations as similar to whole remembered patterns, and, finally, as an 
expert to grasp what is important in a situation without proceeding through a long process of formal 
reasoning.” Id. 
106
  Id. 
107
  Ding, supra note 8, at 44–45. 
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now be able to “see what is absent in a bad argument: sufficient evidence, a 
clear point, consistent logic.”108 
The Phase-4 student should now have a firm grasp on discourse basics; 
therefore, Phase 4 is the right time to cultivate the student’s voice and style. 
Here, the expert can name and illustrate sophisticated writing and analytical 
techniques for the student’s own experimentation, while the student taps 
into her own cadence, syntax, and creative approaches to problem solving. 
This is the more solitary endeavor of the emerging expert and the capstone 
of the skills slowly acquired over three years. Peers, too, can play an 
important role by challenging the writer to explain and defend her position 
in clear prose and compelling arguments.
109
 Reviewing peers’ writing also 
shows how good writing is not formulaic and frees students to explore their 
own voices in their writing. As such, for-credit peer writing groups, where 
an expert facilitates interaction but the students decide on the writing 




E. Suggestions and Proposals for Implementing the Four Phases During 
Law School 
Phases 1 and 2 incorporate much of what LRW professors already do: 
authentic case problems and roles, modeling and scaffolding, introducing 
complexity, and encouraging reflection. But apprenticeship Phases 1 and 2 
would recalibrate first-year LRW teaching to march towards mastery in a 
controlled upward trajectory. Mainly, the integrated apprenticeship counsels 
not to do too much too soon on genre-and-lawyering skills, or too little too 
late on reflective-judgment and context-based writing. In favor of the 
integrated apprenticeship, first-year legal writing should drop contract 
drafting, specialized genres like the appellate brief, and other lawyering 
skills such as interviewing and counseling. Dumping all practical skills 
training into one first-year analytical and persuasive writing course 
confuses the course objectives, compounds students’ cognitive overload, 
and interferes with building mastery, which begins in earnest in Phases 3 
and 4. 
It is in this critical push towards mastery in Phases 3 and 4 where law 
schools usually falter. After 1L year, the typical legal writing requirement 
combines a scholarly paper, a journal piece, or a moot court experience, but 
little or no mandatory practical writing instruction.
111
 In 2010–2011, 
although over a quarter of schools required a third semester of practical 
 
108
  Williams, supra note 9, at 9. 
109
  Ding, supra note 8, at 26–27, 45–46. 
110
  See Linda H. Edwards, Law School Writing Without Teachers: Participating in an Advanced 
Writing Group (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.mercer.edu/sites/default/files/ 
files/advancedwritinggroup.pdf. 
111
  See supra notes 23–24. 
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writing (an increase of over 2% in the last ten years), only 8% extended the 
curriculum to the spring of 2L year and less than 5% carried it through to 
3L year.
112
 Schools without upper-level practical writing requirements tend 
to offer an array of targeted, but uncoordinated, electives.
113
 Thus, most law 
schools do not follow a three-year legal writing mastery process that tracks 
developmental stages and intensifies socialization. And most do not 
methodically fix the ratio of acquisition to learning activities in the upper 
division. Only one category of upper-level LRW course, the “vertical 
advancement approach,” consciously pushes students towards mastery.114 
But just introducing more vertical advancement LRW courses cannot alone 
accomplish the systematic integrated apprenticeship that Phases 3 and 4 
require. 
Mastery of written legal discourse requires mindful practice and 
concentrated effort over long time periods, with challenging work in 
demanding and varied writing roles, in a variety of courses.
115
 The key 
element here is practice, and that is Phase 3 and 4’s emphasis. 
The authors envision a combination of clinical courses,
116
 externships, 





 to doctrinal courses, and peer-writing groups that will flexibly 
deliver a variety of opportunities for students to attain mastery. The second 
year would require two to four credits of advanced writing-based 
coursework, but a student’s upper-level writing requirement would be 
satisfied by this work, freeing up at least one seminar’s worth of credits. 
These credits could be allocated between an advanced writing simulation 
course, a clinic with writing emphasis, a practitioner shadow, or a doctrinal 
 
112
  See ALWD SURVEY, supra note 56, at 24–25. 
113
  See id. 
114
  Michael R. Smith, Alternative Substantive Approaches to Advanced Legal Writing Courses, 
54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 119, 128 (2004). The “vertical advancement approach” aims to “present[] more 
sophisticated aspects of a genre to which the students have already been exposed” by “go[ing] deeper.” 
Id. The “horizontal approach” introduces new types of documents and genres, but is by design 
introductory. Id. at 132. The “survey course approach” aims for breadth on an array of advanced topics, 
but only “scratch[es] the surface” of each—again not promoting mastery. Id. at 133–34. The “integrative 
approach,” which integrates lawyering skills with doctrinal subjects, has some promise; depending on 
the teacher and course structure, mastery may be a byproduct, but it is not the primary aim. Id. at 134. 
115
  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 118 (Lawyering expertise is “well grounded in subtle, 
analogical reasoning achieved through a long apprenticeship to more expert practitioners.” (emphasis 
added)). 
116
  Clinical courses should include mandatory practice writing elements with professor feedback. 
117
  Schools could recruit alums to allow students to shadow their actual writing projects in exchange 
for continuing legal education credit. 
118
  I.e., one-credit supplements to a doctrinal course where students write a brief or memorandum 
and receive feedback from a LRW professor and, ideally, the doctrinal professor or a practitioner in the 
substantive area of law. Brief banks, where students could submit their writing anonymously for peer 
and faculty feedback, would also easily (and inexpensively) allow a law school to achieve progress 
towards mastery in its LRW curriculum. 
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practice-writing add-on. In the third year, students could gain practice 
through clinics, externships, or an advanced practitioner shadow 
experience, again using existing courses and credit allocations or relatively 
inexpensive additions to the curriculum. Additional experiential electives 
should be encouraged in both years. 
Law schools should not underestimate the wealth of resources they 
have for this integrated apprenticeship. Clinics already offer vibrant social 
apprenticeships, doctrinal courses excel at key aspects of the cognitive 
apprenticeship, and LRW simulation courses incorporate elements of both. 
Faculty leadership, vision, collaboration, and curricular coordination are 
what is needed, not unlimited resources, more credits, or new courses. For 
example, even if they do not take on clients and cases, doctrinal faculty can 
teach or partner with others in subject matter-oriented add-ons that model 
and scaffold expert features of practice writing, then coach and fade. LRW 
faculty can do the same in advanced persuasion and appellate advocacy 
courses, or in courses drawing on their practice expertise. Clinic faculty’s 
first obligation is to their clients—and the social apprenticeship fits 
squarely with that requirement—but they can incorporate doctrinal and 
LRW faculty approaches to sweep in cognitive apprenticeship elements. 
Professors must, of course, receive teaching-load credit for this work. 
Indeed, law schools could use teaching-load credit to encourage faculty to 
engage in acquisition teaching rather than just learning-oriented courses or 
subject-matter seminars devoid of strategies towards writing mastery. 
Finally, if law schools seek to differentiate themselves with joint-degree 
programs, globalization programs, concentrations, or particular skills 
offerings, they can do so in conjunction with this core mastery-based 
curriculum. With deliberate planning, Phase 3 and 4’s practice orientation 
can be achieved without undue expense, and without abandoning other 
valued initiatives. 
CONCLUSION 
As this Essay explains, the main obstacles to a mastery-based 
curriculum are surmountable. This Essay proposes a two-part solution. 
First, recalibrate and coordinate the teaching and writing components in the 
existing curriculum—especially in the upper years—to offer a phased, 
progressively more advanced three-year integrated apprenticeship that pulls 
in the social dimension of expertise and broadens the cognitive dimension. 
Second, tap the existing faculty to collaborate with each other, and to 
broaden their teaching vision to consciously, deliberately move students up 
the novice–expert continuum. Students must be given opportunities to 
practice socially authentic writing settings, messy legal problems, and 
writing roles, while mindfully using the cognitive apprenticeship tools. As a 
blueprint for parallel initiatives, this Essay offers the integrated 
apprenticeship LRW case study with specific teaching, curricular, and 
implementation suggestions. 
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Law schools must be realistic about the enterprise of producing 
experts, of course. True mastery in written legal analysis and advocacy will 
take years of practice—perhaps ten or more.119 But a consciously designed 
curriculum will move students towards becoming bona fide members of the 




  Abner & Kierstead, supra note 1, at 371 (applying the ten-year rule to writing). 
